This paper proposes a new side channel attack to RSA cryptography. Our target is an implementation with a combination of countermeasures. These are an SPA countermeasure by m-ary method and a DPA countermeasure by randomizing exponent techniques. Here, randomizing exponent techniques shows two DPA countermeasures to randomize the secret exponent d. One is an exponent randomizing technique using
Introduction
Power attack can reveal the secret key stored in a cryptographic device by using the information obtained from power consumption of the device. Currently, this attack is widely known as a big threat on smart cards and other cryptographic devices. Power attack is classified into two types, simple power attack (SPA) and differential power attack (DPA). For securing the cryptographic device against power attack, the device must resist to SPA and DPA.
The main concern for the countermeasure against power attack is minimizing the extra cost for resisting to these attacks. For securing RSA device, the largest interest is minimizing the overhead of the processing time and many speed-efficient countermeasures are proposed.
History of Countermeasures against Power Attack on RSA
For attacking RSA by SPA, the attacker tries to distinguish square and multiply operations performed in the device by observing the power trace. This attack can reveal the secret exponent d if binary method is implemented, because square and multiply operation is directly related with the bit value of d: square and multiply operation is performed if a bit value of d is 1, and only the square operation is performed if it is 0. For resisting to SPA, some countermeasures are known, which perform square and multiply operation in a constant sequence regardless to d. One countermeasure of this type is a square-and-multiply method [1] . This method is based on the binary method, but dummy multiply operation is performed when a bit value of d is 0. Joye's method [13] is based on the right-to-left binary method, and also performs square and multiply operations in a constant sequence without dummy operation. Another countermeasure is m-ary (window method), which also perform square (S) and multiply (M) operation in a constant sequence as
S S S S MS S S S MS S S S M . . ..
For resisting to DPA, data randomizing is a common countermeasure technique to hide the correlation between the secret exponent d and the power trace. Most popular DPA countermeasure is to randomize a exponent by using the multiplication (RMUL) [1] . In the RMUL, the random- Besides this method, the DPA countermeasures by dividing the exponent with the random number are also proposed (RDIV) [7] , [2] . In these methods, random number r i is generated and the quotient d i, 1 In [7] , r i is recommended to be 20 ∼ 30-bit random number to reduce the overhead of the processing time.
The bit length of r i on RDIV is set to be long as (log 2 d)/2 in [2] . If such a long bit random number is used, the overhead of the processing time can be huge, but this problem is solved by the Shamir's trick mentioned in [3] . With this technique, the overhead of the processing time is very small. RMUL and RDIV are the technique to randomize the exponent. Other than the exponent, the modulus or the message can be also randomized. For randomizing the modulus, N i = N × r i is used for random number r i to decrypt c by (c d (mod N i )) (mod N) (RMOD) [19] . If r i is 20 ∼ 30-bit, the overhead of the processing time is small.
For randomizing the message, c is decrypted by c = ((R i ) e × c)
(mod N) for random number R i (RMES) [5] . This technique involves to compute a pair of the random number and its inverse, but it can be easily computed by (R i ) e = (γ e ) r i (mod N) and R (mod N) are provided. If r i is 20 ∼ 30-bit, the overhead of the processing time is also small. A DPA countermeasure based on the window method is proposed in [12] . This technique randomizes a table data in m-ary method by 20 ∼ 30-bit random number. This countermeasure can also resist to SPA because this technique is combined with m-ary method.
Another DPA countermeasure based on the window method is proposed in [20] . This countermeasure uses the technique to randomize addition chain of window method by repeating to divide the exponent d with small random numbers.
BRIP [14] , [16] and RIP [10] , [11] are DPA countermeasures to randomize the initial data of the modular exponent operation. BRIP provides SPA and DPA countermeasure, while RIP provides DPA countermeasure. RIP can resist to SPA by combining it with SPA countermeasure, but the variation of the combination is limited because it assumes binary method. For using RIP, square-and-multiply method is recommended for resisting to SPA.
An Analysis of DPA Countermeasures by Randomizing the Exponent
Among countermeasures described in Sect. 1.1, RMUL, RDIV, RMOD and RMES randomize the intermediate data for resisting to DPA, but these countermeasures do not resist to SPA. In other words, the strength of RMUL, RDIV, RMOD and RMES against SPA depends on the implementation of modular exponentiation, namely the choice of the binary method or the window method. Among these countermeasures, RMUL and RDIV are the best choice to minimize the overhead of the processing time, because entire processing time is O(n 2 (n + s)) in RMUL and RDIV, while it is O(n(n + s)
2 ) in RMOD and O(n 2 (n + 2s)) in RMES, where n is bit length of N and s is bit length of the random number r i . So we discuss the best choice of modular exponentiation method to be combined with RMUL or RDIV.
Binary method is out of the choice, because (randomized) exponent is directly revealed when the attacker distinguished the sequence of square and multiply operation.
A next choice is the square-and-multiply method [1] . In this method, the sequence of square and multiply operation is repeated in a constant sequence regardless to the exponent, so this method seems to be good choice. But it is analyzed by the power attack proposed by Yen et al. [21] for the left-to-right square-and-multiply method. If this attack is used, the dummy multiply operation can be detected by the attacker, which allows the attacker to reveal the exponent, even when the exponent is randomized by RMUL or RDIV. In this attack, ciphertext c is chosen as c = −1 (mod N) by the attacker. By this choice, the data pattern of the square and multiply operation is limited just only to 3 patterns: 1 × 1, (−1) × 1 and 1 × (−1). Dummy multiply operation in the square-and-multiply method can be detected if these 3 pattern are distinguished. Another choice is SPA countermeasure based on right-to-left binary method, which are right-to-left square-and-multiply method [1] and Joye's method [13] . By using these methods, SPA can be prevented, but overhead of the processing time is large because 2 square/multiply operation are required per 1-bit of the exponent. Now, we can see the window-based modular exponentiation method is the best choice be combined with RMUL and RDIV for securing against SPA with minimizing the overhead of the processing time.
But if the sliding window method is combined with RMUL, it is proposed to be attacked by Fouque et al. when the public exponent e is small [6] . In general, the sliding window method is known to leak the partial bits of the exponent if the square and multiply operations are distinguished. In the Fouque et al.'s attack, the attacker collects non-consecutive partial bit(s) of the randomized exponent with distinguishing the square and multiply operation in sliding window. Then the attacker reveals the secret exponent d by using special search technique which uses these non-consecutive partial bit(s) as the hint to reveal the secret exponent d [6] .
So, we see square and multiply operation must be repeated in a constant sequence when using the window-based modular exponentiation method. For satisfying this requirement in RSA, m-ary method is suitable. By using m-ary method, square and multiply operations are always constantly repeated as S S S S MS S S S M, . . .. Since this sequence is not related to the exponent, no information is leaked by distinguishing the square and multiply operation. And m-ary method is also secure against the attack to detect dummy multiply operation, because no dummy operation is performed. Hence, the best choice of the modular multiplication method combined with RMUL and RDIV is m-ary method.
Overview of Our Proposal
We propose a new attack on the SPA and DPA-resistant implementation providing the RMUL or RDIV with m-ary method, if the public exponent e is small as e = 3 or 65537, and the random number is small as 20-bit. We note our attack can not break RMOD and RMES. Our result means RMUL and RDIV are faster than RMOD and RMES, but not secure against our attack. Our attack to RDIV can be applied to Fouque et al.'s attack [6] , which did not include the attack to RDIV.
In m-ary method, the sequence of square and multiply operation is repeated in a constant pattern regardless to the exponent, which looks to leak no information about the exponent. So how can we get the information of the exponent? As we have already discussed, no information is leaked by distinguishing square and multiply operation because it is repeated in a constant pattern like S S S S MS S S S M . . .. For obtaining the information related with the bit value of the exponent, we applied the Yen el at.'s attack [21] to m-ary method. By choosing c = −1 (mod N) as the ciphertext, we can limit the data pattern of the multiply operation to 2 patterns, 1×1 and 1×(−1). These 2 pattern occur in accordance with the bit value of every m-th bit of the exponent (i.e. least bit of each m-bit window). With our collision-based power attack technique, these two multiply operations can be distinguished from just a single power trace. Therefore, our proposal is very effective and efficient.
Next, we also propose recovery technique of the secret exponent d from these non-consecutive partial bit values. Our technique is an improvement of the special search technique in [6] . With our technique, the secret exponent d can be recovered from the partial bit values with running time O(2 s e), where s is bit length of the random number r i and e is the public exponent.
Therefore, RMUL or RDIV countermeasure with mary method can be totally attacked by using our proposed techniques.
As Fouque et al.'s attack [6] , our attack assumes the case when the public exponent e is small as e = 3, 65537 and the bit length of the random number is 20-bit. These parameters are mostly used in the real application and are propriety assumption. For examining our attack really works in real world, we performed two experiments. First is an experiment of our collision-based power attack to collect partial bits of the randomized exponent. Second is an experiment to reveal the secret exponent d by using the collected information. In the first experiment, we tried to distinguish 1 × 1 and 1 × (−1) from a single power trace, and succeeded to distinguish it. In the second experiment, we tried to find d with our search technique by running a search program on a PC. When running time is O(2 36 ), we succeeded to reveal the secret exponent d within practically short time (less than 10 hours on Core2Quad-3.6 GHz PC) and high probability of success (around 0.9), by collecting the partial bit value of 14 randomized exponents when setting m = 4 on m-ary.
Organization of the Paper
Rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we define the notations. In Sect. 3, we describe Fouque et al.'s attack on RMUL combined with sliding window. In Sect. 4, we describe the overview of our attack on RMUL and RDIV combined with m-ary method. In Sect. 5, we describe the idea of our collision-based power attack and show its experimental result. In Sect. 6, we describe our technique to reveal d by using the information collected by the collision-based power attack, and show its experiment result in Sect. 7. In Sect. 8, we analyze the impact of our attack on the other window-based countermeasures. In Sect. 9, we discuss how to prevent our attack when using the RMUL and RDIV, and describe conclusion in Sect. 10.
Preliminaries
In this section, we define some notations. In the RSA key setting, we use following notations:
• e: Public exponent.
• d: Secret exponent.
• N: A public modulus satisfies N = pq for two large primes p and q, where n = log 2 N.
In RMUL countermeasure, we use following notations.
• r i : Random numbers (
• v: Number of r i .
• s: Bit length of r i with setting s = 20.
In RDIV countermeasure, we use following notations.
•
In our attack, we use following notations.
• Fouque et al. proposed an SPA-based attack on RMUL implementation combined with sliding window method [6] . Entire steps of the attack is shown in Fig. 1 . This attack consists of four steps. In step 1, the attacker calculates upper half of d. In generic RSA key setting, upper half bits of d is difficult to calculate, but if e is very small as 3 or 65537, it is easy to calculate. In such a small e, upper half bits of d is same as
)/e and upper half bits (e.g. leftmost log 2 d + 30 bits) of φ(N) is equal to that of N with high probability. To calculate d H , k is the only unknown parameter. But this is not problem because k is very small value that satisfies 0 < k < e. Especially, k is known to satisfy k = 2 when e = 3 [6] . When e = 65537, the attacker can perform brute-force search for every possible value 0 < k < e. If assumed value of k is not correct, it is detected in the matching algorithms of step 3 described in later. Hence, we can assume that value of k is correct in step 4.
In step 2, the attacker collects the power trace to reveal partial bit value of the randomized exponent
In this step, the attacker distinguishes the square and multiply operation performed in the sliding window method to collect non-consecutive bits of d i as shown in Fig. 2 . If multiply operation was observed, the attacker can know the corresponding bit of d i is 1. If continuous square operations were observed more than m-times, the attacker knows the corresponding bit of d i is 0, where m is the bit length of the window.
In step 3, the attacker tries to find all random numbers If the number of the observed bits of d i in step 2 is longer than 20-bit, the attacker can choose a unique r i . Fur- thermore, if the observed bits of d i is longer than 37-bit (Maximum value of 20 + log 2 k), the attacker detect the assumed value of k is correct or not. r i and k are uniquely chosen with high probability for typical parameter of RSA and sliding window method. If we assume a case d is 1024-bit and m = 4, at least 1/4 of upper half of d i (e.g. 480 bits) would be leaked, which means 120-bit of d i is leaked. This bit length is enough to uniquely determine unique r i and k. Hence, if no matched r i is found for some k and i = 1, the assumed value of k is turned to be wrong, and the attacker returns to step 1 without proceeding the search of r i for i ≥ 2. Most time-consuming process through entire steps is the loop between step 1 to step 3 until correct k is found, and the running time is estimated as O(2 s e). After the correct k and r 1 is found, all r i are obtained by repeating the search of r i for every i = 2, . . . , v.
In step 4, the attacker finds lower-half bits of d. This is done by repeating 8-bit brute-force search, which runs from lowest 8-bit to higher 8-bits. In this search, d 
An Overview of Our Attack
In this section, we propose an attack on RMUL and RDIV implementation combined with m-ary method shown in Table 1. Entire steps of the attack is shown in Fig. 3 .
As previous attack [6] , our attack also consists of four steps. And the objective of each step is also the same as previous attack with the same running time O(2 s e), but the method differs in step 2, 3 and 4, which are summarized as below.
• Step 2: In the previous attack, the attacker obtains partial bit values of the randomized exponent by distinguishing square and multiply operation. But in our attack, the attacker obtains partial bit values of the randomized exponent by distinguishing multiply operation performs 1 × 1 or 1 × (−1) for a chosen message c = −1 (mod N).
• Step 3, 4: When attacking RMUL, method of this step is almost the same as that of previous attack. When attacking RDIV, method of this step is different from previous attack.
Largest difference is step 2. It comes from the assumption of the attack. The previous attack assumes the target device implements sliding-window method, which allows to leak partial information of the randomized exponent by distinguishing square and multiply operations. But our attack assumes the target device implements m-ary method, which does not leak any information of the randomized exponent by distinguishing square and multiply operations. So we adopt another approach to obtain partial bit value of the randomized exponent.
Our approach is to observe the power trace by choosing the ciphertext c as c = −1 (mod N). When c = −1 (mod N) is chosen, data pattern of the square and multiply operation is limited only to 3 patterns, 1 × 1, 1 × (−1) or (−1) × (−1). This idea is based on the Yen et al.'s attack to binary-based method [21] , which enables to directly reveal all bits of the randomized exponent. By applying this idea into m-ary method, we found partial bit values are leaked for every m-th bit. (See Fig. 4.) By using this leaked partial bit values, the attacker tries to obtain the rest of information to reveal d in step 3 and 4, which are the almost same as previous method when attacking RMUL, or modified method when attacking RDIV.
Our attack in step 2 and its experimental result is explained in Sect. 5. Our attack in step 3 and 4 are explained in Sect. 6. 
Our Power Attack to Obtain the Partial Bit Value of Randomized Exponent on m-ary Method
In this section, we describe our method to obtain the partial bit value of the randomized exponent using power attack. Since our target is RMUL and RDIV countermeasures, the attacker must observe the bit information of the randomized exponent just from a single power trace because random number is varied in every time. This observation is not easy because noise always appear in the real measurement of the power trace.
For this goal, we focused on the power attack technique using a chosen message. This technique assumes the attacker can input any value of c as the ciphertext of RSA decryption, which allows to obtain more information than the attack inputting random ciphertext. For attacking RSA, many results with this technique are proposed [4] , [8] , [9] , [21] . We extended the Yen's technique [21] to m-ary method.
Previous Power Attack Using the Chosen Message
In this section, we describe previous power attack techniques using a chosen message on RSA. First attack of this type was doubling attack proposed by Fouque et al. [4] . In this attack, the attacker observes a pair of power traces when c = X (mod N) and c = X 2 (mod N) for some chosen integer X. The attacker guesses some bit of the exponent, and if the guess is correct, same intermediate value appear for these two different inputs. This is so-called "collision", and the attacker can detect it by comparing the power trace of these two inputs.
Another type of the chosen message attack is proposed by Yen et al. [21] . This attack is based on the following observation: if c = −1 (mod N) is input, the data pattern of the square or the multiply operation is limited to only 3 patterns, 1 × 1, 1 × (−1) or (−1) × (−1), which make it easy to distinguish the power trace. Their attack is applicable on both binary method and square-and-multiply always method [1] . It can directly reveal all bits of the exponent from the observed power trace.
By using this idea on binary method, square and multiply operations are easily distinguished because 1 × (−1) corresponds to multiply operation, while 1 × 1 and (−1) × (−1) correspond to square operation. This attack is also applicable on the square-and-multiply-always method [1] , because the attacker can distinguish the dummy multiply operation by distinguishing square operation is 1 × 1 or (−1) × (−1)
† . This attack is extended to the attack using a message pair c = X (mod N) and c = −X (mod N), which is generalized as using the pair (X, Y) satisfying X α = Y α (mod N) [21] . They did not show the experimental result to distinguish the power trace of these attacks, but it was shown by Homma et al. [8] .
Yen et al.'s message pair attack was generalized by Homma et al. [9] . They proposed to use a message pair (X, Y) satisfying X α = Y β (mod N) and showed the validness of the attack by the experiment result.
Basic Idea of Our Chosen Message Attack
For attacking RMUL or RDIV, we assumed that a power attack using chosen message pair is not available, because data pattern of the square/multiply operation is randomly varied between the first and the second message. So we focused on the chosen message attack using c = −1 (mod N) [21] . However, it does not make any sense to distinguish the square/multiply operation or dummy multiply operation on m-ary method. So what type of the information is obtained?
We focused on the window calculated in the process of m-ary method. In Table 1 To avoid this case, the attacker must ignore the power trace when r i is even. If r i is even, it can be detected by distinguishing the final multiply operation of c r i (mod N) is 1×1.
How to Distinguish the Multiplication
If we can distinguish 1 × 1 and 1 × (−1) just by observing the waveform of a single power trace, there is no problem in step 2 of our attack in Fig. 3 . But it will be difficult because we assume to distinguish it from a single power trace including the noise content. So we introduce collision-based power attack technique to distinguish it easier. Our collision-based power is illustrated in Fig. 5 . Let Power i (t) be the power trace of d i in RMUL or d i,1 in RDIV, and Δt be the processing time of square or multiply operation, a differential power trace
is made by the attacker in our collision-based power attack. If the multiplication is 1 × 1, it causes a collision to squaring operation of 1 × 1 performed just before the multiply operation, the differential power trace of this part will be plain. In contrast, if the multiplication is 1 × (−1), the differential power trace of this part will be peak, whose length will be 3Δt as illustrated in Fig. 5 .
Experimental Result of Our Collision-Based Power Attack
In this section, we show the experiment result of our collision-based power attack. As a platform device, we used SASEBO (Sidechannel Attack Standard Evaluation BOard) board [18] shown in Fig. 6 , which is a FPGA-based standard platform for evaluating the strength of side-channel analy- sis. We implemented 128-bit † modular exponentiation algorithm for the randomized exponent with m-ary method for m = 4 on FPGA.
Through this experiment, we set 24-MHz as the clock of the FPGA and 125 Ms/sec as the sampling ratio of the oscilloscope. Our experiment result of the differential power trace by (1) is shown in Fig. 7 . When making each differential power trace, we tuned it with simple moving average to reduce the noise of the single power trace, and the differential trace is made from a single power trace for a randomized exponent d .
We can see both trace reveals us d =???? * * * 1 * * * 1 * * * 0 * * * 1 * * * 0 * * * 1 * * * 1 * * * 0 * * * 1 * * * 1 * * * 0 * * * 0 * * * 1 * * * 0 * * * 1 * * * 1 * * * 1 * * * 0 * * * 0 * * * 1 * * * 0 * * * 1 * * * 0 * * * 0 * * * 1 * * * 1 * * * 0 . . ., † † which perfectly matches the value of d used in the real experiment as d = 0x71f8d6bf6b3c07a73d60187aadba6. . ..
From this result, we can see the power trace of Fig. 7 clearly shows us the partial bit information of d .
Our Attack to Reveal d
In this section we describe our attack to reveal d, which are step 3 and step 4. In step 3, all random numbers r i are revealed from the partial bit value of the randomized exponent obtained by the power attack in step 2. In step 4, lower-half bits of d is revealed from r i and partial bit value of the randomized exponent obtained in step 2. When step 4 is finished, the attacker can obtain all bits of d, because upper half bits of d is already revealed in step 1.
Our Attack to Reveal r i
Our attack to reveal r i on RMUL is shown in Fig. 8 , and that in RDIV is shown in Fig. 9 Both attack fails to reveal any random number r i when input value of k was wrong. So, these attack can be used to check the value of k is correct. (v = 1 is enough to check k.) This checking is unnecessary when e = 3, but necessary when e = 65537 because k is unknown value. Since k is small as 0 < k < e, brute-force search allows the attacker to find correct k. But number of the candidates of the search is large as 2 16 × 2 20 = 2 36 , which is the largest bottle-neck of our all attack steps on revealing d.
Our Attack to Reveal Lower-Half Bits of d
Our attack to reveal lower-half bits of d on RMUL is shown in Fig. 10 , and that on RDIV is shown in Fig. 12. Figure 10 is the almost same as the Fouque et al.'s attack [6] , and Fig. 12 is modified from Fouque et al.'s attack [6] .
Revealing Lower-Half Bits of d on RMUL
In the attack of Fig. 10 on RMUL, right-to-left brute-force † We implemented shorter (128) bit length of RSA due to the resource constraint of the FPGA device. But we assumed our experiment can emulate the 1024-bit or 2048-bit environment, because we suppose our collision-based power attack is not affected by the bit length of RSA.
† † Note that leftmost 4-bit of d cannot be detected from this differential power trace, but the attacker doesn't have to know these bits because it is unnecessary for step 3 and 4 of our attack in Sect. 4. (N) )/e + r i φ(N) for known r i . In our search, candidate value of φ(N) is generated as φ(N) = eλ + (−k −1 (mod e)), for integer λ, which is slightly modified technique from [6] . This technique is convenient because 1 + kφ(N) is always divisible by e, which makes the right-to-left brute-force search easier because lowest bit of d i is perfectly simulated with the same length of the lowest bit of λ.
In this search, λ is divided into m-bit blocks, and brute-force search is performed for every m-bit block running from the lowest block to the higher block. (not to the highest block, because upper-half bits of φ(N) is known). That is, m-bit brute-force search is done for the lowest m-bit of λ from 2 m candidate values as λ = 0000, 0001 . . . , 1111. And if matched m-bit is found as 1101, next upper m-bit is searched from 2 m candidate values as λ = 00001101, 00011101, . . . 11111101, and the similar process is repeated until all bits are obtained.
Here our concern is how to find the matched value from candidate values. It is illustrated in Fig. 11 jm +X for z = 0, 1, . . . , 2 m+1 −1, where X represents the lower bits of λ already found in the search. We call z 'search target', which represents the number of candidate values to determine m-bit in our brute-force search.
In our search on RMUL, search target has m + 1-bit length to match simulated value of d i to match (m j + m)-th and m j-th bit of Leak(d i ) as illustrated in Fig. 11 . After matching candidate is found, lower m-bit of z is selected as next higher m-bit of λ by updating X as X := (z (mod 2 m ))× 2 jm + X. Though the leaked bit Leak(d i ) is non-consecutive, all bits of φ(N) are determined by this search. This is because d i is generated by multiplying φ(N) with random number r i , and the random number makes it possible to leak the various bit value information of φ(N). If d i is not generated by random number as d i = 3φ(N), all bits of φ(N) can not be leaked from Leak(d i ), but it reveals us just only partial non-consecutive bits of φ(N).
We performed an experiment on a PC to examine this attack really reveals all bits of φ(N). We succeeded to reveal φ(N) with high probability as 0.9, if m = 4 and v = 14. See Sect. 7 for details.
Revealing Lower-Half Bits of d on RDIV
In the attack of Fig. 12 on RDIV, left-to-right brute-force search is performed for d. The direction of the search on RDIV is inverse to that on RMUL. This is because of the difference between the multiplication and division. That is, the answer is determined from lowest to highest bit in multiplication, while the answer is determined from highest to lowest bit in division.
As similar in the search on RMUL, d is divided into m-bit blocks, and the brute-force search is performed for every m-bit block running from the center block to the lower block. This search does not start from the highest block, because upper-half bits of d is known. Upper bit is initialized with that of d H = (1 + kN)/e as shown X := [d H ] n,hm in Fig. 12 .
Our method to match every m-bit block is illustrated in Fig. 13 . In this method, matching is done by comparing the simulated value of d i, 1 and Leak(d i ), a partial bit value of d i obtained by power attack in step 3, for all 1
This idea is similar to our matching algorithm on RMUL, but there is a difference in selecting matched mbit value from candidates. In our matching on RDIV, the selected candidate value might be wrong, because d i,1 is simulated by dividing the candidate value by r i . Since the candidate value is determined from upper bit to lower bit, the simulated value of d i,1 is approximated value of d i,1 , but contains error with some probability.
For example, let us assume the case d is d = 0x9876ff34. . . for m = 4. In this case, left-to-right search goes well until the intermediate search result is d = 0x987?????. . ., but the problem is next 4-bit search. We know the answer is 6, but the search algorithm might regard both 6 and 7 are matched candidate value, because '6 f f in d = 0x9876ff34. . . is close to '700 , and both of them might match the search algorithm because of the error in simulat- ing d i, 1 .
We can't prevent this error completely unless (almost of) all bits of d are known, but we can reduce the probability of error. To reduce the probability of the error, we recommend to enlarge the bit length of the search target. This idea is included in Fig. 12 , in which d i,1 is simulated by "u i = y/r i ". We note y is the candidate value of d given as y = X + z × 2 jm by z and X, where z is the search target of mg-bit value and X is the upper bit value of d already found in the search. In Fig. 10 , bit length of the search target z is m + 1, but it is enlarged to mg by the parameter g to reduce error. As parameter g is larger, the probability of error is reduced, but the running time becomes larger. We recommend to set g as to mg is close or equal to 20.
Unlike our search on RMUL, plurality of the matched candidate can be found in our search on RDIV, no matter how g is large. Hence, our search in RDIV picks up plurality of matched candidate values. It is noted as 'X C, j ' in Fig. 12 , which is a set of m-bit matched candidate values. For example, if both of 0x6ff and 0x700 are matched for m = 4, X C, j becomes X C, j = {6, 7}. The operation to the set X C, j is noted by '←' (e.g. X C, j ← X C, j ∪ [z] mg−1,mg−m ;), to distinguish it from the operation to other variables. Number of the set of X C, j is stored in τ j of Fig. 12 .
Due to the error in simulating d i,1 , this search algorithm does 'roll-back' when no matched candidate is found. The 'F' flag in Fig. 12 holds the result whether matched candidate value is found or not. If some candidate is found, F is 1. But if no candidate is found, F is 0. And the 'roll-back' routine is performed if F is 0 after all search for 0 ≤ z < 2 We performed an experiment on a PC to examine this attack really reveals all bits of d. We succeeded to reveal d with high probability 0.91, if m = 4 and v = 14, which is similar result on RMUL. See Sect. 7 for details.
Experimental Result to Reveal d
In this section, we report the experiment result to reveal d for validating our attack. As described in Sect. 4, our attack consists of four steps. The attack method of step 2 is power attack, and the attack method of other steps is the programming code runs on a PC. This section reports the experimental result of step1, 3 and 4 ran on a PC. Experimental result of the step 2 is reported in Sect. 5.
In the experiment, we performed our attack on RMUL and RDIV. In both attack, we set RSA the key parameter as e = 3, 65537 and n = 1024, 2048. Parameter of m-ary is fixed to m = 4, bit length of the random number s is set to s = 20, the number of the random exponent attacked in step 2 is fixed to v = 14, and the bit length of the search target of our attack on RDIV is set to mg = 20(g = 5).
We implemented our attack with the Shoup's NTL library [17] , and ran it on a Fedora 7 PC with Core2-Quad 3.6 GHz CPU.
In the experiment, we measured the running time and the success ratio of our attack in the experiment. All of results are summarized in Table 2 .
In all cases, our attack succeeded with high probability (from 0.8 to 0.95) even when v is not so large (v = 14). From the result of the attack on RDIV, we can see that g = 5 gives enough high probability to reveal correct d.
If we compare the running time of e = 3 and e = 65537, the case e = 65537 is much longer than the case e = 3. This difference come from the running time is O(2 s e), that is, brute-force attack of k is required in the attack e = 65537, while it is not required in e = 3. The step to find correct k takes the longest time in these parameter settings, but we can see the running time practically short because all attacks finished within 10 hours.
From these results, we can see the validness of our attacks, which can reveal d within short time (at most few days even when using middle-range PC) and high probability (around 0.9).
Impact of Our Attack on the Other Window-Based Countermeasure
In this section, we discuss the impact of our attack on other window-based countermeasures for RSA. [14] , [16] In this countermeasure, the exponent is not randomized. By using our attack in step 2, d can be obtained for every m-th bit, but information of other bit position of d is not leaked. Hence it is difficult to reveal d from these information.
Window Method Version of BRIP

Ciet-Joye Countermeasure [2]
This is variant of RDIV, where the randomized exponent d/r i and d (mod r i ) are calculated for random number r i whose bit length is large as (log 2 d)/2. If such a large bit length is used, it is difficult to reveal random number r i by brute-force search as step 3. So this countermeasure is difficult to attack.
8.3 MIST Countermeasure [20] In this countermeasure, random addition chain is constructed by repeating to divide the exponent d by small random numbers. Similar as Ciet-Joye's countermeasure [2] , such a long sequences of random number looks like to be difficult to attack by brute-force attack, but further discussion be needed to prove its security. [12] In this method, all window data are randomized as w[ j] = c j2 20 +r i for 0 ≤ j < 2 m and 20-bit random number r i . Such a short random number might be a good target by brute-force search in step 3, but this search is impossible because the attacker can not get any partial information in step 2. In this countermeasure, the table data is calculated as w[ j] = c j2 20 +r i and all table data hold the same data when inputting c = −1 (mod N). This cannot satisfy the assumption of the attack in step 2. So this countermeasure is difficult to attack.
Randomized Window Method
Countermeasures against Our Attack when Using RMUL or RDIV
This section discusses how to resist our attack by using RMUL or RDIV countermeasure with small public exponent. The simplest method is to avoid non-CRT decryption. If CRT decryption is used, our attack does not work because the attacker can't calculate d H to obtain upper-half of d in step 1, d H will be d H = (1 + kp)/e or d H = (1 + kq)/e in the CRT decryption, but this value can not be calculated without p or q. Without the information obtained in step 1, the attacker can not proceed to next steps.
If non-CRT decryption must be used, most effective protection is a message filtering shown in the presentation of [8] . That is, if c = −1 (mod N) is input, the device returns the RSA decryption as c d (mod 2) (mod N). If the device is used for RSA only (not used as DH or DSA engine), the last bit of d is always 1. So the decryption result is calculated as c. Otherwise, combining with RMOD or RMES is also good countermeasure, but the overhead of the processing time will be larger.
Extending the bit length of random number is also effective, because it is obtained by brute-force attack in step 3. So if its bit length is large enough to be unbreakable by brute-force search, the attacker can not obtain d. When using this method, we recommend to use 80-bit or longer bit of random number. Problem of this method is the overhead of the processing time will be larger.
In case of using RDIV, our attack is avoided by adding two limitations. The first is to force the random number to be even, and the second is to calculate modular exponentiation (c 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new attack RSA imple-mentation using RMUL and RDIV countermeasure combined with m-ary method, which was supposed to be secure combination. To attack the implementation with this combination, we have proposed a collision-based power attack using only a chosen message to leak every m-th bit of the exponent on m-ary implementation. This attack is very effective even when the exponent is randomized for every execution of the modular exponentiation because of using only a single power trace. We have attempted the experiment using only a single power trace, and revealed every m-th bit of the exponent. We have also proposed technique to reveal d from these partial bits of the randomized exponent, and showed our attack can really reveal d by the experiment ran on a PC within 10 hours.
